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Judge Robert Bork inveighed against courts that decided on
the basis of their own values. Judges, he said, must employ only
those principles that they could derive, define, and apply neutrally.1 By neutrally, he meant without bringing in their own
conception of the good.2 Yet he also endorsed judicial elaboration
of doctrines that would keep the Constitution up with the times
and sparred with his then-colleague Antonin Scalia on that issue. 3 Bork thought that judges could be objective and creative at
the same time. Moreover, he was well aware that judges face interpretive difficulties even when they are not self-consciously
making their own contribution. He believed that interpretive
uncertainty could be resolved without judicial value choice and
had to be if the courts were to retain their legitimacy.
Recent scholarship has explored possible responses to legal
indeterminacy. One body of work, now often going under the
name of "construction," asks what judges and other interpreters
do and should do in order to select among plausible meanings.4
Another line of scholarship deals with judge-made doctrine, especially constitutional doctrine.5 This Essay briefly discusses

t James Madison Distinguished Professor and Joseph C. Carter Jr Research Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. Law Clerk to the Honorable Robert H. Bork,
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1982-1983.
1 See generally Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 Ind L J 1 (1971).
2
Id at 3.
3 See Ollman u Evans, 750 F2d 970, 995-97 (DC Cir 1984) (en banc) (Bork concurring) (endorsing judicial modification of doctrine over time and disagreeing with Judge
Scalia); id at 1038 n 2 (Scalia dissenting) (disagreeing with Judge Bork).
4
Important work on construction in this sense includes Keith E. Whittington,
Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning (Harvard
1999), and Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-ConstructionDistinction, 27 Const
Commen 95 (2010).
5
Leading contributions on this topic include Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional
Decision Rules, 90 Va L Rev 1 (2004), and Richard H. Fallon Jr, Implementing the Constitution (Harvard 2001).
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Bork's thinking on those problems, and comments on the current
issues in light of that discussion.
The first issue I will discuss is uncertainty as to the meaning of an authoritative text. To say that the highest norm in this
country is the Constitution's text is only the beginning of the
analysis. For example, an interpreter seeking the original semantic meaning of a part of the Constitution must deal with the
possibility that at the relevant time more than one meaning was
in use by well-informed speakers of English. Sophisticated language users may have had different concepts that went by that
name, each coherent and related to the others, but nevertheless
distinct.
Indeterminacy of that kind can be resolved in different
ways, some of which may entail normative judgments by the interpreter. One possibility is that the concept of language meaning itself contains the resources to deal with situations like this.
Perhaps when there are plural meanings, the most common one
is the meaning, with others as variants. Applying that principle
to the facts of history may be difficult, but does not in principle
require a normative judgment. But if plurality like this is handled by identifying the meaning that best fits the Constitution's
overall scheme, normative judgments are more likely to enter.
And if the appropriate meaning is simply selected from among
the candidates on the basis of the interpreter's views about the
best result, normative judgments are inevitable.
The problem of multiple plausible semantic meanings is important, but of limited relevance in Robert Bork's thinking. Although Bork firmly embraced originalism, sometimes emphasizing intent and sometimes emphasizing text, his interpretive
method was in fact overwhelmingly structural. He reasoned
from claims about the kind of government the Constitution creates, and in particular from that government's fundamentally
democratic character. Indeed, he used that structural principle
to derive the methodological principle with which he is so closely
associated and that I am exploring in this Essay: the principle
that judges must not decide on the basis of their own values.
Bork relied on the essentially democratic character of the
Constitution to address two notorious and important instances
of textual unclarity, both involving the so-called level-ofgenerality problem. The freedom of speech and of the press
found in the First Amendment can be understood more or less
abstractly. In more abstract form, it is a political or moral principle
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that constrains the legal rules that affect expression. In more
concrete form, it is itself a body of such legal rules; for example,
the rule that allows the criminal punishment of seditious libel
provided that truth is a defense and jury trial is available.
According to Bork, structural considerations pointed to a
particular formulation, more general than the legal rules that
prevailed at the time of the framing but more specific than a
broad license to convey whatever messages one wishes without
adverse legal consequences. In his famous 1971 article, Bork
brushed text and history aside and rested his argument entirely
on structure.6 As a judge he seemed more concerned with history, but located the appropriate reading at the same level of generality and for basically the same reason. For representative
democracy to succeed, debate on political issues must be substantially uninhibited by legal sanctions directed to speech.7
Democracy, and the constraint it imposes on unelected, lifetenured judges, also figured centrally in Bork's approach to two
vexed questions concerning the Equal Protection Clause. Bork
defended Brown v Board of Education of Topeka8 and rejected
permission for symmetrical race discrimination, as in Plessy u
Ferguson,9 on the grounds that judges needed a principle of racial equality general enough to relieve them of the need to make
controversial choices.o Under Plessy, they had to decide that
physical equality mattered, but that the psychological inequality
that might result from separation did not," so that the message
of inferiority conveyed by separation was merely a construction
placed upon it by black people. Those were choices judges should
not make.12
Having ascended to that level of generality in interpreting
the Equal Protection Clause, Bork stopped, once again on
grounds of democracy and judicial restraint. In 1986 he rejected
the argument that the clause restricts discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation:
The intentionalist may conclude that he must enforce black
and racial equality but that he has no guidance at all about

6

7
8

9
10
11
12
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Olman, 750 F2d at 996-97.
349 US 294 (1955).
163 US 537 (1896).
See Bork, 47 Ind L J at 14-15 (cited in note 1).
See Plessy, 163 US at 544.
See Bork, 47 Ind L J at 13-15 (cited in note 1).
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any higher level of generality. He has, therefore, no warrant
to displace a legislative choice that prohibits certain forms
of sexual behavior. That result follows from the principle of
acceptance of democratic choice where the Constitution is
silent.

...

In short, the problem of levels of generality may

be solved by choosing no level of generality higher than that
which interpretation of the words, structure, and history of
the Constitution fairly support. 13
The higher the level of generality at which a constitutional limitation operates, the more it restricts subconstitutional law. If
one equates subconstitutional law with democracy and believes
that the Constitution regards democracy as the norm and limitation of democracy as the exception, that is a reason to resolve
doubts in favor of less-general readings.
But as Bork himself explained, the Constitution both empowers and constrains lawmakers, with the constraints partly
enforced by the judiciary. That is the structure he called Madisonian.14 To find that one aspect of the system, democratic
choice, is primary and the other, limitation on democratic choice,
is secondary, so that one should be preferred over the other in
doubtful cases, is a quite subtle inference. Bork did not base his
argument on any particular piece of the text, and it would be
very difficult to make such an argument. The Constitution gives
and limits power, but it does not say whether one kind of provision

13 Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, OriginalIntent, and Economic Rights, 23 San
Diego L Rev 823, 828 (1986). Bork's statement is ambiguous. He may have meant only
that the Constitution means what its enactors expected or desired it to accomplish and
that they did not expect or desire to accomplish anything with respect to discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation. On that reading, displacement of legislative choice is
simply a way of referring to a finding of unconstitutionality, and Bork said no more than
that the Constitution means what it means. But he may have meant something significantly different, and I think that he did. Bork was addressing the argument that the
text, at least, is unclear as to its level of generality; the principle that the Constitution
means whatever it means will not tell anyone what it means. In response, he said that
the text should be read at a level of abstraction no higher than the words, the structure,
and the history will support. Why not read the text at a level of abstraction no lower
than one that can be so supported? Requiring that the level of abstraction be as low as
possible, however, does make sense if displacement of democratic choice is independently
undesirable. (It might be undesirable either because nonconstitutional law, being easier
to make or change, is more democratic than the Constitution, or because constitutional
law inevitably reflects the value choices of judges.) It thus seems to me quite likely that
Bork believed that the structural principle in favor of democracy provided an interpretive principle to be applied to the Equal Protection Clause.
14 Bork, 47 Ind L J at 2-3 (cited in note 1).
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is normal while the other is, in Professor Alexander Bickel's
word, "deviant."15

Any such inference must be based on the structure as a
whole. Structural reasoning is perfectly common, but requires at
least a limited form of normative reasoning, reasoning that goes
beyond identifying semantic meaning. Structural reasoning proceeds from particulars to the more general principles that produce them by asking, what would have led a reasonable constitution maker to choose those particular features? Sometimes the
answer will be that the particulars support no inference to a
meaningful structural principle, because different constitution
makers with different priorities, all reasonable, all might have
produced the same design. A constitution that combines substantial legislative power with important affirmative limits
thereon might reflect the view that democracy is basic and limitation should be imposed only when absolutely necessary. It also
might reflect the view that democracy is to be distrusted and
limitation is wholesome, but that drafting limitations well is difficult. If the designer had been led by the latter weighing of
competing interests, interpreters might well say that they
should be eager to extend limitations in light of understandings
that had not been available to the drafters but had arisen in the
course of experience.
The possibility that concrete provisions will underdetermine
abstract design principles can lead in more than one direction.
One response is to embrace normative interpretation and say
that interpreters should attribute to the Constitution the principles that would have led them, as reasonable drafters, to produce the concrete provisions. But someone like Bork who believes that judges, at least, should not be following their own
values will be very troubled by that way of deducing structural
principles.
Another response is to rely on only those structural principles that any reasonable designer must have relied on. Whether
many principles will satisfy this test is doubtful. Even more
doubtful is whether any reasonable author of the Constitution
must have thought that democracy is the rule and judicially enforced limitation is the exception. In my view, norms as broad as
that one generally are constructions as that concept is now used:
15

See J. Skelly Wright, ProfessorBickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme

Court, 84 Harv L Rev 769, 784 (1971) (noting that Bickel regards the Supreme Court as
a 'deviant' institution in a democracy").
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they will rest on both genuine constitutional principles and also
the normative views of those who support the construction, because those views will establish the priority among constitutional values that is necessary to produce determinacy at such a
high level of generality. A preference for nonconstitutional law
over constitutional law might well appeal to construction makers who had had a bad experience with judicial review.
Robert Bork, however, did not indicate that he was proposing something that would now be called a construction. He
seems to have regarded the fundamentally democratic character
of the Constitution as so blindingly obvious that it hardly required any explanation. Anyone could see that limitations on
democratic power enforced by the courts were a carefully cabined exception, not the basic principle. He was certainly not
alone in that view. His great friend Alexander Bickel worked
from the same premise, as did Bork's colleague Professor John
Hart Ely. 16
Perhaps they were right; it is hard to match that trio as
students of the Constitution. But not everyone will see it that
way. As indicated above, I would say that a reasonable person
who thought democracy fundamental could have written the
Constitution-as could a reasonable person who thought limitation on democracy fundamental-so the structure does not support inferences based on one assumption or the other.
We know that Bork made structural inferences with confidence and that he inferred that the Constitution fundamentally
creates an electoral democracy. We can only speculate, however,
about the details of his understanding of structural reasoning.
In particular, I know of no evidence bearing on his approach to
the situation in which reasonable minds differ as to the design
principles that can be inferred from the observed structure. If he
thought that the inferences he drew were indubitable, the problem may well never have occurred to him. I suspect that he did,
and that it did not.
While we do not know how far Bork would have been prepared to go with structural inferences that did not seem obviously

16 Bork followed Professor Charles Black in concluding that substantial protection
for political speech could be deduced from the constitutional structure even without the
First Amendment. See Charles L. Black Jr, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional
Law 39-48 (Louisiana State 1969). Ely's view of the Constitution is reflected in the first
word of the title of his enormously influential book on constitutional theory. See John
Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust:A Theory of JudicialReview 44-48 (Harvard 1980).
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correct to him, it is possible to identify one interesting potential
answer that may seem to be consistent with his principles but
that I think is not. It is tempting to think that Bork would have
favored an approach to structural inference, and to the resolution of ambiguity and vagueness more generally, that produces
determinate answers. If the Constitution is less determinate in
its meaning, there is more room for judicial subjectivity. But the
preference for democracy against judicial value judgments is itself the product of a structural inference. Once established, it
might be used to guide interpretation on other issues, but it
cannot be established using the premise that clear answers are
preferred because they avoid judicial value judgments. As Professor Bork explained in his Constitutional Law I class, circular
arguments are not wrong, but they are also not helpful, because
they do not tell us anything we do not already know.
Recent scholarship has also explored the role of judge-made
doctrine as a means of implementing constitutional provisions
that are clear in their semantic meaning but vague in their application. Vague standards make for unpredictable and sometimes unprincipled results, as adjudicators take advantage of
fuzzy edges to follow their own views of justice and sound policy.
In a system with judicial precedent, the highest court can impose a certain amount of determinacy by establishing rule-like
generalizations for future cases and lower courts to follow instead of directly applying the vague provision themselves.
Equal protection levels of scrutiny provide a standard example. Hardly anyone believes that the Equal Protection
Clause's semantic meaning embraces strict scrutiny for racebased classifications and intermediate scrutiny for classifications based on illegitimacy. As Justice Stevens said, "There is
only one Equal Protection Clause."17 To say that the clause denounces only one form of classification, which may for example
be called invidious classification, is also to say that it is quite
vague. One might think that race classifications are especially
likely to be invidious, sex-based classifications somewhat less
likely to be invidious, and so on. The Supreme Court can transform such generalizations, by themselves only rules of thumb,
into binding rules. Through the operation of the rules of precedent, it can establish tests that lower courts (and the Court in
its later cases) are to treat as conclusively identifying violations

17
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of the underlying vague standard. Of course, those tests will
make mistakes, as judged by the actual, vague norm. For a court
to establish such a test is therefore in effect for it to legislate, effectively replacing the Constitution's text with a doctrinal proxy
for it. Doctrine has the relation to the Constitution's rules that
rules have to their reasons.
To call the elaboration of doctrines judicial lawmaking is not
just rhetoric. It emphasizes the fact that producing a doctrine
routinely requires making very contestable normative judgments. Because generalizations make mistakes, choosing a generalization means choosing among different kinds of mistakes.
One of the best-known trade-offs in Anglo-American law is said
to justify the standard of proof in criminal cases: it is better to
let ten guilty men go free in order to keep from convicting one
innocent man. Others might favor a different burden, thinking
that one jailed innocent is worth only five criminals set free. The
equal protection tiers of scrutiny are set up so that they will err
on the side of barring racial classifications, and so will convict
some that are innocent, so that no guilty will go free. Whether
that makes sense depends on how harmful genuinely unconstitutional racial classifications are, and how harmful the thwarting of legitimate subconstitutional decisions is.
Robert Bork, as far as I know, simply took judge-made doctrine for granted; whether he had any view on its origins, I
doubt. But he did believe in it and candidly distinguished between constitutional and statutory norms and the judicially constructed tests that implement them. Almost certainly, that early
awareness of judicial creativity derived from his work as an antitrust scholar. Bork was too sophisticated to believe that the
semantic meaning of "restraintof trade" included a per se ban

on horizontal price fixing. Before he turned to constitutional law,
he called the adumbration of doctrine under the Sherman Act
that "awesome task" of the judge.18
Bork accepted that some doctrines, at least, would change
with the times. He was untroubled by such change and the judicial
18 "Courts charged by Congress with the maximization of consumer welfare are free
to revise not only prior judge-made rules but, it would seem, rules contemplated by Con-

gress." Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J L &
Econ 7, 48 (1966). That was because "Sherman and others clearly believed that they
were legislating a policy and delegating to the courts the elaboration of subsidiary rules."
Id. The "awesome task" of the judge was that of "continually creating and recreating the
Sherman Act out of his understanding of economics and his conception of the requirements of the judicial process." Id.

http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev_online/vol80/iss1/13

8

Harrison: Robert Bork, Judicial Creativity, and Judicial Subjectivity

2013] Robert Bork, Judicial Creativity, and Judicial Subjectivity

213

creativity that brought it about, as long as the judges always
took the authoritative enactment as their "major premise."19
Bork did not expand on the difference between major and minor
premises, nor on the source or character of the latter.20
He may have believed that the distinction was just a matter
of degree, and that that was enough. If there is a meaningful
distinction between large and small value or policy choices, then
confining courts to the latter really will reduce their policymaking role. How one might identify the difference, however, is
hard to say. Equal protection scrutiny shows how doctrine can
rest on a quite delicate and controversial judgment. To know
whether to err on the side of finding race discrimination unconstitutional, one must know which is worse, bad race discrimination that is permitted or harmless race discrimination that is
forbidden. The cost of permitting bad race discrimination, however, is not a secondary issue; it is the very thing on which the
drafters of the clause, by hypothesis, based their primary decision. A court that makes that choice is doing the same work as
the framers.
Considering another possible answer to this question can illuminate both Bork's thinking and the problem of judicial implementation of authoritative texts, especially the Constitution.
The value Bork found in the Sherman Act, with the help of his
rejection of judicial value judgments, is a maximand: the purpose of the Sherman Act is to maximize consumer welfare.21
While it is conceivable that more than one set of antitrust doctrines would produce the most possible consumer welfare, the
constraints are tight enough to make that unlikely. Bork himself
praised the rigor of microeconomic analysis and very likely
thought that the inferences he drew from it were essentially deductive, pointing to a single conclusion. Although judges might
differ as to that answer, they would agree that in principle only
one of them was right. And in Bork's view the limited role of the
judiciary meant that courts were obliged to find an interpretation of the Sherman Act that they could implement without
making forbidden value judgments.22
19 Bork, 23 San Diego L Rev at 826 (cited in note 13).
20 Id.
21 See Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox:A Policy at War with Itself 20 (Basic
Books 1978).
22 Bork endorsed the reading of the Sherman Act that "takes a pro-consumer policy
as the base rule and requires exceptions in particular cases to be made by the legislature." Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: PriceFixing and Market

Published by Chicago Unbound, 2017

9

University of Chicago Law Review Online, Vol. 80 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 13

214

The University of Chicago Law Review Dialogue

[80:205

Bork had less to say about the elaboration of constitutional
doctrine, but he applied a similar principle to judge-made constitutional law. He favored the rule of Brown over that of Plessy on
the grounds that the former did not require that courts tell good
from bad race discrimination on the basis of their own value
judgments.23 A simple ban on race discrimination, with no exception for separate but equal, was in accordance with the proper
judicial role.
Brown and Plessy were already familiar territory when Bork
wrote about them in 1971. He set out to blaze a new trail for the
First Amendment in his concurring opinion in Olman v Evans.24
Although he explicitly embraced judicial creativity, there is no
reason to think that he had significantly changed his view of the
permissible extent of judicial choice. His reasoning in Ollman
suggests that he thought the courts to operate under fairly tight
constraints in creating First Amendment doctrine, as they did
under the Sherman Act. He assumed that the First Amendment
required some practical degree of press freedom and urged a
rule that in his view would achieve it.25 Bork did not ask whether his rule was only one of many, among which a judge could
choose on the basis of the judge's own values. He did not present
it as such a choice, but as the best solution to the practical problem posed by the Constitution and changing circumstances. An
example he gave of a similar development, the Supreme Court's
decision to treat electronic eavesdropping as a search, did not
involve a judicial selection among options based on the judges'
preferences.26 That interpretation of the Fourth Amendment answered a yes-or-no question.
Quite possibly, Bork believed that judges perform a difficult
but purely technical task, one in which the text's posited values
constrain their instrumental inquiry so that it has in principle
one right answer. If so, he would have been untroubled by judicial creativity. He seems to have thought that, or something
quite like it. Indeed, because he embraced a limited judicial role

Division, 74 Yale L J 775, 838-39 (1965). That understanding, he said, enables the
courts "to be impersonal in an important and desirable sense." Id at 839.
23 See Bork, 47 Ind L J at 14-15 (cited in note 1).
24 750 F2d 970, 994 (DC Cir 1984) (Bork concurring).
25 "We now face a need similar to that which courts have met in the past. [New
York Times u] Sullivan, for reasons that need not detain us here, seems not to have provided in full measure the protection for the marketplace of ideas that it was designed to
do." Olman, 750 F2d at 996 (Bork concurring).
26 Id at 995-96 (Bork concurring).
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as a basic constitutional principle, Bork almost certainly believed that doctrine making was legitimate only insofar as it
could be done without significant value choices. Courts could
make law, but only while remaining courts. 27
Bork took some things for granted. He seems simply to have
assumed that courts would make lawlike doctrine, and his view
about the Constitution's fundamentally democratic character
may have been more an assumption than a conclusion carefully
reasoned to. His view about the judicial role and the impropriety
of judicial value judgments, however, was self-consciously derived from more fundamental premises. It was not just an assumption. And having derived it with some care, he sought systematically to base his approach to judge-made-law interpretainterpretation on it.

The contemporary debates about doctrine, its sources and
its justification, can profit from that kind of careful inquiry into
and exposition of the judicial role. For one thing, a natural argument from vagueness to judge-made law makes an assumption that, on careful examination, proves to be more controversial than it may seem. As noted above, courts make law by
setting binding precedents and can make law only insofar as
they may do so. 2 8 Judge-made law concerning vague constitutional provisions arises when rules of thumb that courts use to
aid them in resolving vagueness harden into binding rules, and
thereby replace the amorphous provision with a norm that is
more determinate and, for that reason if no other, different.
Rules of thumb turn into binding rules because of precedent:
when courts take as authoritative a formulation found in a prior
case, they substitute the prior case's proxy for the rule itself.
Precedent is familiar enough, but it is a contingent feature
of the legal system. If precedent were not binding, each court in
each new case would apply vague constitutional provisions with
nothing more than rules of thumb to guide it. That would have
serious drawbacks, which is why stare decisis is so common a
27 Bork apparently applied his principle that judges should not make value choices
both to judge-created doctrine and to the identification of meaning; he did not present
the difference between Plessy and Brown as a difference in judge-made rules, but rather
as a difference in interpretation. As far as I know he did not consider the possibility that
the limited judicial role affects the two differently.
28 Judge-made doctrine is an artifact of the rules of precedent and the appellate
hierarchy within which they operate; for example, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit does not make law for the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia.
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rule, but in my view the Constitution permits Congress to limit
or eliminate the rule of stare decisis by the federal courts, because the rules of precedent are themselves subconstitutional,
and subject to Congress's power to carry into execution the judicial power. 29 The claim that the Constitution in effect requires
the judicial creation of rule-like doctrines through precedent
should be examined and defended, not simply taken for granted.
If the rules of precedent are not inevitable, then the exercise of
judicial policy discretion that goes into making binding rules out
of rules of thumb is not inevitable either. Whether that discretion is consistent with the courts' constitutional role is a question to be answered on its own terms.
If courts inevitably will apply vague provisions in ways that
reflect their own views about sound policy, and if in the process
they create binding precedents that are more rule-like than the
Constitution itself, then in effect courts will in a real sense make
law. They will make law under those circumstances even when
the vague provisions have, in principle, one right answer in every case. If that is how the constitutional system works, one
might reasonably regard judicial lawmaking as inevitable but
nevertheless unfortunate, on the grounds that the tendency to
apply vague provisions in accordance with one's own policy
views comes from frail human nature, not the Constitution itself. But judicial lawmaking might be genuinely defensible, rather than regrettable even if inevitable, if some constitutional
provisions are fundamentally indeterminate even in principle.
Perhaps some constitutional provisions are not just vague, but
genuinely incomplete. They might do nothing more than supply
a value, not in the highly constraining sense that Bork seems to
have assumed, but in a way that is not by itself enough to resolve particular cases, even in principle. Here the most natural
model is the kind of statutory grant of authority to an administrative agency that gives the agency a goal and imposes some
constraints, but still leaves the agency with important choices to
make. Statutory provisions like that are quite properly likened
to delegations of legislative power, precisely because they leave
the agency to choose among competing values in formulating a
rule that will actually decide cases. A directive that a regulatory
agency set rates and ensure a fair return on investment for the
29 See John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 Duke L
J 503, 505 (2000) (arguing that rules of precedent in federal courts are federal common
law subject to change by Congress).

http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev_online/vol80/iss1/13

12

Harrison: Robert Bork, Judicial Creativity, and Judicial Subjectivity

2013] Robert Bork, Judicial Creativity, and Judicial Subjectivity

217

regulated industry constrains the agency somewhat but is nevertheless incomplete, requiring that the agency either make
substantive choices of its own or decide in a merely arbitrary
fashion.
Perhaps the Constitution has provisions that are genuinely
incomplete in that sense, incapable on their own of applying to
concrete questions. If so, the argument that the Constitution
genuinely endorses judicial lawmaking, rather than tolerating it
as an unavoidable failing of judges, is plausible. That is not to
say, however, that the Constitution contains any such provisions. A provision that is merely vague, and in principle complete, will function much like one that is truly incomplete when
applied by courts that follow stare decisis and are used to making their own policy judgments. Provisions that are not delegations of authority to the courts can appear to be such delegations
because of their functional similarity. But functional similarity
is not identity, and one reason to examine one's premises is to
distinguish the similar from the same. Judges, lawyers, and
scholars are thoroughly accustomed to a system in which the
Supreme Court of the United States operates as if it were an
agency granted power under a statute that is often vague and
sometimes underdetermines concrete results. To take that metaphor for reality, and to interpret the Constitution in light of it,
however, is to reason in a circle, to justify one's assumptions on
the basis of one's assumptions. And as Robert Bork said, circular
reasoning, though not false, leads only around in a circle.
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